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Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. 
They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently 
little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data 
for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to 
three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or 
parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. 
  The paper finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per 
capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of 
government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of 
oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general 
trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a 
different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high income 
countries, less common in low income countries and least common in middle income countries 
while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the ombudsman offices is most common in 





World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388, September 2004 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 
or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. 
                                                           
1 Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University 
2 Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank Institute 
 
An earlier abridged version of this paper was presented at the Southern Political Science Association 
conference in New Orleans, January 2004. A modified version of that earlier draft can be found in  























































































































2.  The Oversight Tools………………………………………………………………3 
3.  The Distribution of Oversight Tools and the Potential for Oversight…………….6 
4.  Oversight Tools and the Forms of Government…………………………………. 7 
5.  Oversight Tools and Income Level………………………………………………13 
6.  Oversight Tools and the Level of Democracy…………………………………   17 







1.  The Tools of  Parliamentary Oversight………………………………………  8/9 
2.  How Common are these Oversight Tools?……………………………………  10 
3.  Countries and Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools……………………  10 
4.  How Common are the Tools of Parliamentary Oversight by Form of  
                              Government……………………………………………………  11 
5a  Form of Government and Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools………….12 
5b  Number of Oversight Tools by Form of Government…………………………. 12 
6.   Number of Oversight Tools by Income Level…………………………………..14 
7.   Committee Hearings by Income Level………………………………………….14 
8.  Hearings in Plenary Session by Income Level………………………………….15 
9.  Use of Questions by Income Level…………………………………………….. 15 
10. Use of Question Time by Income Level……………………………………….. 15 
11. Use of Interpellation by Income Level………………………………………….16 
12. Committees of Enquiry by Income Level…………………………………… …16 
13. Presence of an Ombudsman as Oversight Tool by Income Level……………    17 
14. Number of Oversight Tools by Level of Democracy…………………………   18 
 




In a recent issue of the Quaderni di Scienza Politica, Roberta Maffio published a 
comparative analysis of parliamentary oversight
3in which she elaborates a conceptual 
mapping of the oversight tools, discusses the characteristics of  oversight tools, and 
investigates whether the adoption of  oversight tools by parliaments is related to the 
model of  democracy (i.e. majoritarian, consensual, or mixed)
4.  
  The analysis between type of democracy and oversight potential was conducted in 
a sample of  24 countries. Twenty-one of these countries are the democracies investigated 
by Lijphart (1984),
5 while the other three are Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Maffio divided 
the 24 countries into three groups depending on whether their government was 
majoritarian, consensual, or mixed. She then estimated the oversight potential for each  
country, using the 1986 data of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
6.   
  Maffio concluded that there is no correlation between model of democracy and 
oversight potential. “There are some majoritarian democracies with strong oversight 
potential (such as Greece) and others with weak oversight potential (such as Ireland, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom).” Similarly, among consensual democracies, she found cases 
                                                           
3 Roberta Maffio, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Il controllo parlamentare dell’ attivitá di governo in 
prospettiva comparata”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, vol. IX, n. 2, (Agosto) 2002, pp. 333-383.  
4 Roberta Maffio, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Il controllo parlamentare dell’ attivitá di governo in 
prospettiva comparata”, op. cit., p. 359. 
5 Arend Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 
6 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliaments in the World: a Comparative Reference Compendium, Aldeshot, 
Gower, 1986.  
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characterized by both high oversight potential (such as Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands) and by low oversight potential (for example, Japan)
7. 
           The purpose of the present paper is to investigate whether the oversight potential 
of parliaments is related to other variables; however, we present two major differences 
from Maffio’s paper. First, instead of using the 1986 IPU data, we use the data that the 
IPU collected in collaboration with the World Bank Institute (WBI) in 2001. Our 
analyses are performed on the 83 cases for which the IPU-WBI data are available
8. And 
second, in contrast to Maffio, we investigate whether there is any relationship between 
oversight potential and types of constitution (i.e. presidential, semi-presidential, or 
parliamentary), national income levels, and levels of democracy.   
In the first section of this paper, after providing a working definition of oversight, 
we review some of the tools that parliaments can use to oversee the activities of the 
executive. We underline that oversight tools can be grouped on the basis of two criteria : 
the first concerns whether a specific oversight tool is employed before (ex ante) or after 
(ex post) the enactment of a government-sponsored policy, and the second concerns 
whether oversight is exercised internally or externally to parliament.  
  Though the data collected by the IPU in collaboration with the WBI do not 
provide evidence as to the effectiveness of the oversight tools, they do provide some 
measure regarding the potential for oversight. Our line of reasoning is straightforward, as 
we suggest that a parliament’s potential to oversee the executive increases as the number 
                                                           
7 Roberta Maffio, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Il controllo parlamentare dell’ attivitá di governo in 
prospettiva comparata”, op. cit., p. 361. 
 
8 See Table 1 in this paper.  
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of oversight tools available to that parliament increases. The second section of this paper 
investigates the adoption of oversight tools.  
          The subsequent three sections investigate how the adoption of oversight tools and, 
hence the potential for oversight, are related to and, possibly, affected by other variables. 
The third, the fourth and the fifth sections analyze the relationship between the number of 
oversight tools and the type of constitution, the relationship between the number of 
oversight tools available and the countries’ income level, and, finally, the relationship 
between the number of oversight tools available  and the level of democracy.  
          In the sixth and final section of the paper we draw some conclusions as to the 
relevance of our findings. 
 
The Oversight Tools 
Before we discuss what the various tools that parliaments can use to oversee the 
executive branch are, we need to define what is meant by ‘legislative oversight’. In a 
Research Paper of the National Democratic Institute, legislative oversight was defined 
“the obvious follow-on activity linked to lawmaking. After participating in law-making, 
the legislature’s main role is to see whether laws are effectively implemented and 
whether, in fact, they address and correct the problems as intended by their drafters”
9. 
This definition captures the role that parliaments play in overseeing government policies 
and activities after they have been enacted but it overlooks that parliaments may be 
engaged in oversight activities well before a policy is enacted.  Parliaments oversee the 
                                                           
9 National Democratic Institute, “Strengthening Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations”, 
Legislative Research Series, Paper # 6, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 19.  
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executive not only with regard to the execution and implementation of policies but also 
with regard to the preparation of policies. This is why, paraphrasing Lees’ definition of 
legislative oversight, we refer to legislative oversight of the executive as to “the behavior 
of legislators and their staff which affects executive behavior”
10. 
In overseeing the executive,  Parliaments have several different oversight tools at 
their disposal. The most common oversight tools are committee hearings, hearing in 
plenary sessions of the parliament, the creation of commissions of inquiry, questions, 
question time, interpellations, the ombudsman, auditors general, and the public account 
committees
11. 
These oversight tools can be grouped along two dimensions. The first dimension 
pertains to the timing of the oversight activity. If legislative oversight is performed before 
the government enacts a specific policy or becomes engaged in a specific activity, then 
the oversight tools are “instruments of control ex ante”
12. Hearings in committees, 
hearings in the plenary sessions of the Parliament, along with the request of 
documentation are all tools that can be used ex ante. If the legislative oversight is 
performed after the government has enacted a policy to check whether the policy is 
properly implemented, then the oversight tools are instruments of control ex post. 
Questions, interpellations, the creation of committees of inquiry are the tools that are 
                                                           
10 Lees defined oversight as “the behavior by legislators and their staffs, individually or collectively, which 
results in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior”, see John D. Lees, “Legislatures and 
Oversight: A Review Article on a Neglected Area of Research”, Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 2, n. 2, 
(May) 1977, pp. 193-208. 
 
11 A description of some of these tools can be found in National Democratic Institute, “Strengthening 
Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations”, Legislative Research Series, Paper # 6, 
Washington, DC, 2000, especially pp. 19-32.  
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used ex post. The second dimension pertains whether the oversight tools are established 
inside or out side the Parliament, that is whether they are internal or external oversight 
tools. Questions, question time, interpellations, hearings, public account committees are 
internal tools, while ombudsmen and auditors general are external tools. 
The IPU, in collaboration with WBI, conducted a survey on Executive-Legislative 
relations; some 180 Parliaments were surveyed, and 83 responded (82 national 
parliaments plus the European Parliament). Respondents were asked questions 
concerning the accountability of the government to the parliament, the impeachment 
procedure, the dissolution of parliament, the oversight of  government, budgetary 
oversight, oversight of implementation of the budget, oversight over foreign policy, 
oversight over national defense policy, the parliament and the state of emergency, the 
verification of the constitutionality of laws, and, finally, oversight over the application 
and evaluation of laws. In this note we will focus only on the oversight of the 
government. 
Respondents were asked several questions: whether the government in their 
country was considered an institution that must report to Parliament, how does the 
parliament exercise oversight, whether parliamentarians could question government 
officials, whether time for questions was allocated in Parliament, whether interpellations 
were foreseen and, finally, whether there was an ombudsman in the country
13.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Roberta Maffio, “Quis Custodiet Ispos Custodes? Il Controllo Parlamentare dell’Attivitá di Governo in 
Prospettiva Comparata”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, …, pp.333-383. The quote is taken from p. 348. 
13 A discussion for why questions, question time, interpellations should be considered as instruments of 
parliamentary control can be found in Roberta Maffio, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Il controllo 
parlamentare dell’ attivitá di governo in prospettiva comparata”, op. cit., pp. 333-383. See also David G. 
McGee, The Overseers. Public Accounts Committees and Public Spending, London, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association in Association with Pluto Press, 2002.     
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These data are relevant in two respects. First of all, they indicate parliaments’ 
potential for effective oversight by showing which institutional arrangements have been 
adopted to enhance oversight. And second, they can be used to investigate whether the 
distribution of oversight tools is related to other variables such as a country’s form of 
government, the national income level and a country’s level of democracy as measured 
by the Gastil index. 
 
The Distribution of Oversight Tools and the Potential for Oversight 
 
The data presented in Table 1 provide interesting information in at least three respects. 
First of all, these data indicate that there is considerable variation in how common are 
these various tools of parliamentary oversight.  
           For example, parliamentarians can put oral or written questions to the government 
in 79 of the 82 countries for which data are available or in 96.3 percent of the cases. 
Committees of inquiry and committee hearings are also common instruments of 
parliamentary control, utilized in more than 95 percent of the countries for which data are 
available. By contrast, interpellations and the ombudsman are substantially less common, 
with interpellations to the government used in about 75 percent of the countries while an 
ombuds office is instituted in less than 73 percent of the countries. Data are presented in 
Table 2.    
        Second, the analysis of the data indicates that all countries adopt some parliamentary 
oversight tools and that most of them use more than one tool. Complete information is  
7 
available for only 49 of the 83 countries that were surveyed; in the remaining 34 
countries information was provided incompletely or was not provided at all (as in the 
case of Lesotho). In any case, more than 12 percent of the countries for which complete 
information is available use 4 tools of parliamentary oversight, more than 14 percent of 
them used 5 tools, almost 33 percent of them used 6 tools while the remaining 40 percent 
used 7. Data are presented in Table 3. 
  
Oversight Tools and the Forms of Government 
 
In addition to providing information concerning the distribution of oversight tools and the 
potential for parliamentary oversight, the IPU-WBI data shed some light on how tools 
and types of oversight are related to another institutional feature, that is the form of 
government
14. Here again, an analysis of the data is informative. First of all, the analysis 
makes clear that the number of oversight tools available varies from one constitutional 





                                                           
14 Respondents were asked to indicate what form of government was in their countries. Responses were 
coded : Presidential form of government was given value 1, Parliamentary form of government was given 
value 2, Semi-Presidential form of government was given 3, Parliamentary form of government in 
countries with a Constitutional Monarchy was given  4, Parliamentary form of government in countries 
with a Hereditary Monarchy received 5, and other forms of government were all given value 6. In our 
analysis, we adopted a different coding scheme. Countries that were given value 2, 4 or 5 by the IPU 
dataset were all considered to have a parliamentrary system and were hence collapsed into a single 
category.  
8 














Andorra yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a. yes 
Angola  yes no Yes  yes no yes  no 
Armenia yes  yes No yes  yes no  no 
Austria  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Australia yes no Yes  yes yes no  yes 
Azerbaijan n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  no  n.a.  yes  yes 
Belarus  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  n.a. 
Belgium  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Benin  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Brazil yes  yes  Yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Bulgaria yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  no 
Cameroon yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no  no 
Canada    yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
China yes  yes  Yes  yes  n.a.  no  n.a. 
Congo n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  yes  no  yes  yes 
Costa  Rica  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Croatia  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Czech 
Republic 
yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Cyprus yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
Estonia  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
EU yes  yes  Yes  yes  n.a.  yes  yes 
France  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Gabon  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Germany yes yes Yes yes no yes  yes 
Greece  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Guatemala  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  n.a. 
Guinea 
Bissau 
yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Guinea  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Hungary  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Iceland yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  yes 
Indonesia yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Iran yes  yes  Yes  yes  no  yes  n.a. 
Ireland yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  yes 
Ivory Coast  no  no  Yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
Kazakhstan  no yes  Yes  yes yes no  no 
Korea yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
Jamaica yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no yes 
Japan  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Jordan yes  yes  Yes  yes  no  n.a.  yes 
Latvia yes  yes  Yes  yes  n.a.  yes  yes 
Lesotho  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. 
Liechtenstein  yes yes No yes no yes  no 
Lithuania yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Luxembourg  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Macedonia n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  yes  no  yes  yes 















Madagascar  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Mali  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Mexico yes  yes  Yes  no  yes  n.a.  yes 
Mongolia yes yes Yes yes yes n.a.  no 
Namibia yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a. yes 
Netherlands yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  yes 
Nicaragua yes  yes  Yes  no  no  yes  yes 
Niger  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Palau  yes no Yes  yes no yes  yes 
Philippines  n.a. yes Yes yes yes n.a.  yes 
Poland yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  yes 
Romania yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Russia  n.a. n.a. n.a. yes n.a. n.a.  yes 
Rwanda no  no  No  yes  yes  yes yes 
Samoa n.a.  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no  yes 
Senegal yes  yes  Yes  yes  no  no yes 
Singapore yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  no 
Spain  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Slovak 
Republic 
yes yes n.a. yes yes yes  yes 
Slovenia  yes yes n.a. yes yes yes  yes 
South Africa  yes  yes  n.a.  yes  yes  no  yes 
Sudan yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  no 
Sweden  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  yes 
Switzerland  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Tajikistan n.a.  n.a. Yes  yes  n.a.  yes  n.a. 
Tchad yes  no  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Thailand yes yes  Yes  yes yes  n.a. yes 
Togo  yes yes Yes yes yes yes  no 
Tunisia yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no yes 
Turkey yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no no 
Uganda yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  n.a.  yes 
Ukraine  n.a. yes n.a. yes yes yes  yes 
United 
Kingdom 
yes yes Yes yes yes no  yes 
Uruguay yes no Yes  yes  n.a.  yes  no 
Zambia yes  yes  Yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Zimbabwe  n.a. n.a. n.a. yes yes n.a.  yes 
Yemen yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  no no 
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Table 3. Countries and the Number of Parliamentary Oversight Tools 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 



















































































Note: The score of the countries in Italics indicates that information concerning the presence/absence of 






hearings in plenary sittings, question time and interpellations are generally more common 
in parliamentary forms of government, than  in presidential and semi-presidential 
systems. As a result, legislatures in parliamentary systems have more oversight tools and 
oversight potential at their disposal than legislatures in either presidential or 
 
 













  %   of   N  %   of   N  %   of   N  %   of   N  %   of   N  %   of   N  %   of   N 
Parliamentary  100      34  97.1     35  96.9     32   100       32  88.6     35  76.9    26  77.8    36 
Presidential  88.2     17  83.3     18  100      19  85.7      21  78.9     19  72.2    18  77.8    18 
Semi-
Presidential 




semi-presidential systems. See Tables 5a and b. As noted above, these results do not 
allow us to make any inference as to the effectiveness of the oversight tools,  
that is as to whether legislatures in parliamentary systems are more effective than 
legislatures in either presidential or semi-presidential systems in overseeing the executive 
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Table 5b. Number of Oversight Tools by Form of Government 
 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Form of Government  4  5  6  7  Tot  Mean 
Presidential  2 2 7 2 13  5.69 
Semi-Presidential  3 3 3 5 14  5.71 
Parliamentary  1 2 6 11  20  6.35 






Oversight Tools and Income Level 
 
In the 2002 World Development Indicators published by the World Bank countries are 
divided in three groups : high-income economies, in which the gross national income 
(GNI) per capita was $ 9,266 or more;  middle-income economies, which have a GNI per 
capita of  between $ 755 to 9,265; and low-income economies, in which  the GNI per 
capita is below $ 755. We transformed this information into a quantitative variable, by 
assigning value 1 to countries in the low-income group, value 2 to countries in the 
middle-income group and value 3 to countries that belong to the high-income group. 
Having created this variable, we then investigate whether there is a relationship 
(and if so, what type of relationship) between income levels and oversight.  By cross-
tabulating our Income variable with the number of oversight tools that are available to a 
country’s parliament, we find that there is a clear, and strong linear relationship between 
the income level and the number of oversight tools. The number of oversight tools in the 
countries that have provided information in this respect varies from a minimum of 4 to a 
maximum of 7. Parliaments in low-income countries have an average of 5.5 oversight 
tools at their disposal, parliaments in middle-income countries have an average of 6.25 
oversight tools while parliaments in high-income countries have an average of 6.27 




Table 6. Number of Oversight Tools by Income Level 
 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Income  Level  4 5 6 7 Total  Mean 
Low  4 4 7 3 18  5.50 
Middle  1 2 5 8 16  6.25 
High    1 1 6 7 15  6.27 
Total      49   
 
 
Examining the distribution of each of the oversight tools by income level, the data 
presented in Table 7 suggest that committee hearings become an increasingly popular 
oversight tools as we move from low- to middle- and high-income countries. Such 
hearings are used in less than 91% of the low-income economies for which survey data 
are available, in almost 97% of the middle-income countries and in all the high-income 
countries. 
 
Table 7. Committee Hearings by Income Level 
 
Do countries have committee hearings? 
Income level  No  Yes  Total  % yes 
Low  2  19 21 90.5 
Middle  1  29 30 96.7 
High    21 21 100 
Total  3  69 72  
      
 
Hearings in plenary settings are not as common as committee hearings, as the data 
presented in Table 8 illustrated, but even these become an increasingly more  
common oversight tools as we move from low- to middle- and high-income countries : 
hearings in plenary settings are used in only about 82% of the low-income countries, in 
about 94% of the middle-income countries and in more than 95% of the high-income 
countries.   
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Table 8. Hearings in Plenary Settings by Income Level 
 
Do countries have hearings in plenary settings? 
Income level  no  Yes  Total  % yes 
Low  4  18 22 81.8 
Middle  2  30 32 93.8 
High  1  20 21 95.2 
Total  7  68 75  
      
 
 
The use of questions and question time as oversight tools follows the same pattern 
that we have observed with regard to both committee hearings and hearings in plenary 
settings. They all become increasingly more common oversight tools as we move from 
lower- to higher- income level. Questions are used in 92.3% of the low-income countries, 
97% of the middle-income countries and in all the high-income countries. Similarly, 
question time is used instead in about 79% of the low-income countries, 83 % of the 
middle-income countries and in a little more than 90% of the high-income countries. Data 
concerning the use of questions and question Time as oversight tools are presented 
respectively in Table 9 and 10. 
 
Table 9. Use of Question by Income Level 
 
Do countries use questions as oversight tool? 
Income level  no  Yes  Total  % yes 
Low  2  24 26 92.3 
Middle  1  33 34 97.1 
High    21 21 100 
Total  3  78 81  
 
Table 10. Use of Question Time by Income Level 
Do countries Question Time as oversight tool? 
Income level  no  Yes  Total  % yes 
Low  5  19 21 79.2 
Middle  5  25 30 83.3 
High  2  19 21 90.5 
Total  12 63 75   
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The use committees of enquiry, of interpellations and of the ombudsman offices 
follows a different pattern. The survey data suggest that the use of interpellations as an 
oversight tool is very common in high-income countries, less common in low-income 
countries and least common in middle-income countries : they are used in about 81 % of 
the high-income cases, in about 77% of the low-income cases, and in less than 70% in the 
middle-income cases. Data are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Use of Interpellation by Income Level 
Do the countries in these income level use interpellations? 
Income level  no  Yes  Total  % yes 
Low  5  17 22 77.3 
Middle  8  18 26 69.2 
High  3  13 16 81.3 
Total  16 48 64  
 
 
Finally, the presence of   committees of  enquiry and of  Ombuds offices as 
oversight tools is most common in middle-income countries, less common in high- 
income countries and least common in low-income countries. Data concerning the 
presence of  committees of enquiry and of the Ombuds offices by are presented in Table 
12 and 13. 
 
Table 12. Committees of Enquiry by Income Level 
 
Do the countries in these income levels have Committees of Enquiry ? 
Income level  no  Yes  Total  % yes 
Low  2  20 22 90.9 
Middle    30 30 100 
High  1  19 20 95 




Table 13. Presence of Ombusman as oversight tool by Income Level 
 
Do countries have an Ombudsman? 
Income level  no  yes  Total  % yes 
Low  11 14 25 56 
Middle  5  25 30 83.3 
High  5  16 21 76.2 





Oversight Tools and Level of Democracy 
 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the relationship between the level of 
democracy and the number of oversight tools that are available to the legislature. Before 
we can do so, however,  we need to discuss how our ‘democracy’ variable is 
operationalized.  
The Freedom House computes an annual index of freedom for all the countries in 
the world; this index is regarded by many social scientists as a proxy index of democracy; 
known as Gastil index, it is computed in the following way. The Freedom House assigns 
to each country a political rights score and a civil liberties score. Both scores are 7-point 
scales. The index of freedom is estimated by adding a country’s political rights score to 
that country’s civil liberties score and by dividing their sum by 2. This means that the 
Gastil index of freedom is also a seven point scale. So, for example, if the fictional 
country of Abbaba has a score of 3 for its political rights and of 4 for its civil liberties, 
then Abbaba’s democratic score is (3+4)/2 that is 3.5. Countries that score from 1 to 2.5 
points on this scale are considered democratic; countries scoring from 3 to 5.5 are quasi- 
18 
democratic, while countries with a score of 5.5 or higher belong to the group of non-
democratic countries.  
  Our ‘democracy’ variable was constructed by re-coding the Gastil index of 
freedom by assigning value 1 to democratic countries, value 2 to quasi-democratic 
countries and value 3 to non-democratic countries. Having created this variable, we then 
investigated whether there is a relationship (and if so what type of relationship) between 
the level of democracy in a given country and the number of oversight tools available to 
that country’s parliament. By cross-tabulating our level of democracy variable with the 
number of oversight tools that are available to a country’s parliament, we find that there 
is a clear, and strong linear relationship between the level of democracy and the number 
of oversight tools. Non-democratic countries have on average 5 oversight tools, quasi-
democratic countries have an average of 5.71 tools, while democratic countries have an 
average of 6.41 oversight tools. Data are presented in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Number of Oversight Tools by Level of Democracy 
 
Number of Oversight Tools 
Level of Democracy  4  5  6  7  Total  Mean 
Democracy  1 2 9 15  27  6.41 
Quasi  Democracy  2 3 6 3 14  5.71 
Non  Democracy  3 2 3   8 5.0 





The major question that we addressed in this paper is whether the potential for 
parliamentary oversight, as reflected by the number of oversight tools available in a given  
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country, is related to/ affected by other variables. Specifically, we investigated whether 
there is a relationship between the number of oversight tools and form of government, 
national per capita income levels, and level of democracy. 
  We found that the oversight potential is affected by these variables. Beginning 
with the relationship between oversight potential and form of government, we found that 
legislatures in parliamentary systems are better equipped – in terms of oversight tools - 
than legislatures in either presidential or semi-presidential systems, while we did not find 
a parliament’s oversight potential is particularly affected by whether there is a 
presidential or semi-presidential form of government. Legislatures in parliamentary 
systems have an average of 6.35 oversight tools, in contrast to the average of 5.69 
recorded in presidential systems and the average of 5.71 recorded in semi-presidential 
systems. 
  Our second set of findings concerns the relationship between the oversight 
potential and national per capita income levels. In this respect we found that the oversight 
potential is greatly affected by the income level. In fact, parliaments in low-income 
countries have on average a much smaller number of oversight tools at their disposal than 
their counterparts in both middle- and high-  income countries. Interestingly, the 
oversight potential is not particularly affected by whether the country is middle- or high- 
income.   
Our third set of findings concerns the relationship between the oversight potential 
and the level of democracy. In this regard we found that the average number of oversight 
tools is  almost linearly related to the level of democracy, so that the more democratic a  
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country, the more oversight tools are at the disposal of that country’s parliament. Non-
democratic countries have an average of just 5 oversight tools, quasi-democratic 
countries have an average of 5.71 oversight tools, and democratic countries have an 
average of 6.41 oversight tools. What does this mean? Does this mean that the adoption 
of additional oversight tools makes countries more democratic or does it mean that  
because countries are already democratic that they adopt additional oversight tools? In 
other words, is it possible to detect a clear arrow of causality? The data at our disposal 
and the analyses that can be performed with these data do not allow us to formulate a 
positive answer for this question. A uni-directional, causal influence cannot be detected.  
In addition to these methodological reasons, there are also some theoretical 
reasons why it may not be possible to answer the question above. It is well known, in the 
study of  social sciences, that the relationship between variables instead of being uni-
directional is often bi-directional. This means that one variable (Y) is determined by 
another variable (X) which, in turn, is determined by (Y). This could very well be the 
case of the relationship between level of democracy and oversight potential. If what 
distinguishes democratic regimes from non-democratic ones is that they entail 
representation, accountability and responsiveness, and if oversight tools are the 
institutional instruments that contribute to keeping governments accountable, then it is 
not surprising that democratic countries may want to adopt oversight tools. Yet as a 
country’s oversight potential increases, so does the level of democracy, thus providing  a 
virtuous circle.       
21 
  Having established that the relationship between the level of democracy and the 
oversight potential is possibly bi-directional, let us focus on one of the two aspects of the 
relationship, that is on the fact that as oversight potential increases, so does the level of 
democracy. This finding has important practical consequences for the international 
community and those international organizations seeking to reduce global poverty and 
promote good governance. If democracy is “a condition without which development and 
poverty reduction strategies could not be properly implemented”
15, and if oversight tools 
are the institutional devices that are associated with the transition of countries to full 
democracies, then it becomes of  considerable importance for the international 
community to better understand the dynamics of parliamentary oversight, the role that 
oversight tools can play in the promotion of  government accountability (and thus, 
democratic development  and good governance) and to identify and disseminate 
examples of good practice practices. By doing so, the international community 
contributes to creating the conditions for sustainable long-term development. 
This paper contributes to such an understanding by explaining the incidence of 
parliamentary oversight tools and relating this to important economic and political 
variables. Further research needs to be undertaken on the effectiveness such tools – but 
given the difficulties of measuring parliamentary performance across countries
16 such 
research should perhaps first be through the development of country case studies, 
attempting to measure changes in effectiveness over time. 
                                                           
15 The quote is taken from Riccardo Pelizzo and Frederick Stapenhurst, “Legislatures and Oversight: A 
Note”, Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 
New Orleans, Louisiana, 7-10 January, 2004.  
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